

# Venture

JOURNAL OF THE FABIAN COMMONWEALTH BUREAU

VOL. 13 No. 8

SEPTEMBER 1961

MONTHLY 1s

## Comment

### ANOTHER DEVLIN COMMISSION?

THE crisis in Northern Rhodesia has reached the point where something constructive must be done immediately. The most sensible course of action is that suggested by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence Party: the appointment of a commission of enquiry along the lines of the Devlin Commission for Nyasaland, which, despite its shabby treatment by the British Government, led in effect to Nyasaland's present constitution. The death roll among Northern Rhodesian Africans—nearly a score at the time of writing—is rising, the causes are clearly political, and a military solution is both impracticable and morally wrong.

The root of the present violence is clearly brought out in an article by Mr. Colin Morris of the N.R. Liberal Party which we publish this month.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Macleod has blundered very badly in his dealing with Northern Rhodesia. He has restored Sir Roy Welensky's prestige and increased European intransigence. He has thereby immeasurably heightened the political risks of restoring Northern Rhodesia to a peaceful path to African government.

The folly and waste of the bad feeling and incipient violence now being created is the more shaming when we reflect that the differences between Mr. Kaunda and the British Government are no more than this: Mr. Kuanda would be prepared to work the constitution if Asian and Coloured voters, now placed on a separate roll, were restored to the common roll; and if the absurd 12½ per cent. requirement were replaced by a simple five per cent. of both rolls. It is as simple as that. Is it too much to hope that confidence and harmony in Northern Rhodesia will

not be sacrificed to this narrow margin of disagreement?

Not that the central theme of the Central African situation should be forgotten. Eight months ago the Federal Review Conference adjourned essentially in order to arrange new constitutions for Northern and Southern Rhodesia *such that the African majorities living in the Federation should be more disposed to accept its continued existence*. New constitutions have now been produced. Both have been totally rejected by the principal African nationalist movements. In Nyasaland Dr. Banda's Malawi Congress Party has been returned with a large majority and is committed to secession from the Federation.

The Commonwealth Bureau has never had any hopes for the Federation as long as Southern Rhodesia remained in political control of European parties. We do not pretend that a clear African majority constitution for Northern Rhodesia would have persuaded Africans there to accept the Federation—any more than it has in Nyasaland. It is by now abundantly clear that the Federation, if not yet formally buried is little more than a mummified corpse with a frozen smile propped up on view at the undertakers.

It is all the more shocking to reflect that it was precisely in order to salvage this *hopeless* Federation that the British Government palmed off Northern Rhodesia with its present monstrous constitution. The first draft, whatever its many disadvantages, would have put the United Federal Party in opposition; and would have ensured an anti-Federation majority—of both races—reflecting the opinion of the vast majority of the population. All the cant bandied about concerning the non-racial—*forsooth*—nature of the new constitution blinds no one to the motives behind the change.

<sup>1</sup> Page 4.



But the issues at stake are much wider than the future of the doomed Federation. Sabotage and violence are a fearful warning that the British Government threatens the interests, if not the lives, of their own celebrated 'kith and kin' as well as 2½m. Africans, whose future two months ago seemed hopeful at least.

It would be simple and comforting to ascribe the violent outbursts to the UNIP which gave Mr. Kaunda unlimited powers to conduct a passive resistance campaign at its congress in July. The restrictions placed on the Party show that the Government has already yielded to this view, indicating once again its refusal to learn from past expensive mistakes. Unfortunately the truth may be far more unpleasant; that an intolerable strain has been placed upon the leadership of UNIP, which may not be able to continue in the face of shabby and deceitful treatment to control its more extremist members.

### Southern Rhodesia

The outlook for Southern Rhodesia is no less dangerous. In the short run the new Constitution, and its acceptance by the white electorate, is a clear advance on the old. But Britain will now relinquish its powers to protect and promote the interests of the African majority in face of what is still a largely white parliament. Africans will not—and cannot be expected to—accept the present electoral arrangements as permanent. Yet they have no effective constitutional means of changing them. These are the essential facts, and Southern Rhodesia must expect the same dreary and destructive course of events until its parliament—the seat of constitutional power—reflects the interests of the people as a whole—the source of real political power. Now that the British Government is no longer an effective political power in the territory, politics are likely to assume an increasingly racist bias, as they have in South Africa.

If the British Government yielded to the big battalions of the United Federal Party, it must also be said that Mr. Nkomo and his National Democratic Party were constantly outmanoeuvred. The task of the N.D.P. is of course supremely difficult, trying as it must to organise and co-ordinate the strength of a largely voiceless and increasingly rootless African people. The strike, for instance, was a failure because it was called too late, with no preparation and too soon after the successful call to vote in the unofficial referendum. It was discouraged also by 26,000 troops, rifles at the ready, who were called out in Salisbury and Bulawayo to 'protect the Africans from intimidation'. Nothing has been settled by Southern Rhodesia's new Constitution.

### MUNSTER REPORT\*

IN general the Commissioners have produced a useful report for Uganda's constitutional future. They have clearly been at pains to study the immensely complicated forces at work.

The starting-point of the report is the recognition that because of Buganda's strength, cohesion, and above all her economic wealth and lead in education, she occupies a special position which calls for special consideration. The Commission suggests that 'the Protectorate should continue until Buganda reconciles herself to a fruitful relationship with Uganda'. The implied suggestion that Buganda is entirely to blame for the present situation is neatly avoided in para. 110: 'The obvious reality of this conflict, and Buganda's consistent policy over many years, make it hard to treat her demand for secession as mere bluff. It is the logical result of a consistent policy, the causes of which can be readily understood.'

In its main recommendations the Commission accepts the realities of the situation by devising a unique constitutional framework designed to meet a unique need. It is neither purely federal nor purely unitary—as the traditionalists and the British respectively have urged from time to time. In fact it can be said that by recommending a strong central government having overriding financial and legislative powers, the Commission has taken away with one hand what it gave with the other to Buganda. Through its control over Buganda's finances the proposed central government would be in a strong position *vis-à-vis* Buganda since 'payments of grants would be contingent upon the grant-aided services being carried out in accordance with the general policy of the central government . . .' This may be difficult for Buganda to swallow.

Also likely to arouse controversy is the recommendation that Buganda should be allowed to choose whether it elects representatives to the National Assembly directed or indirectly. It is suggested that this would keep national politics out of Buganda and thus perpetuate tribalism. But careful study of the report reveals an ingenious method of democratising Buganda without necessarily provoking a direct constitutional clash on this issue. Indirect elections to the National Assembly are made conditional upon direct elections to the Lukiko itself. From this provision two consequences follow: First, the organisation of the Buganda electorate for direct elections to the Lukiko will open the way for political parties to enter into the Buganda field; and second, the people of Buganda themselves must eventually

\*Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission, 1961, Government Printer, Entebbe, Uganda.



discover that if they can directly elect their representatives to the Lukiko there is no reason why they cannot elect them directly to the National Assembly too.

The projected September Conference is to consider Uganda's future constitution in the light of the report. If this conference is to succeed Buganda's participation is a *sine qua non*. The problem is whether between then and now Buganda will be in a state of mind to participate. The re-opened negotiations between the Buganda Constitutional Committee and the Governor will, it is hoped, help towards bringing about such a state of mind. If on the other hand the present negotiations were to end in deadlock owing to Mengo's intransigence the odds may be against the Mengo regime. The Chief Minister, Mr. Benedicto Kiwanuka, has made it clear Mengo will be ignored in the last resort; and he may be helped in the tough line he proposes to take by the economic distress in the country, which is in part due to the barren policy which has been pursued by Mengo over the last few years.

### GLIMPSE OF HOPE

THE election of the new Prime Minister of the Congo, Mr. Cyril Adoula, gives some ground for hope that the nightmare crisis of the country's first independent year might be drawing to a close. Mr. Adoula has been described as a 'moderate', as a 'man of the centre': like many African leaders he fits into no such glib category. He is primarily a convinced democratic socialist of a militant kind, with a serious trade union background. As a democrat he is unswervingly anti-communist; as a socialist he has militantly supported former Congolese leaders, including Mr. Lumumba, against the influence of Western economic interests; as an African nationalist he is determined to avoid foreign intervention in his country's affairs from any quarter.

The problems of the Congo remain, of course, what they were before his election. Politically he must achieve two objects: he must reconcile his own government with the Stanleyville 'government' of Mr. Antoine Gizenga, and he must bring Katanga back under the authority of the central government. Already there are glimmerings of success in both. Mr. Jason Sendwe, who controls north Katanga, and who was an ally of Lumumba, has accepted one of the three posts of Vice-Premier. Another is reserved for the cautious Mr. Gizenga himself, who, if no further crisis breaks out, is likely to appear in Parliament as soon as he is assured that he will be safe.

Katanga, of course, will hold out as long as the government feels it can do so without coming to blows with a united Congolese army. But a

glance at Mr. Tshombe's clever but hardly consistent political record, leaves in little doubt that he will come to terms when there is no alternative. (At present Katanga has two Ministers seeking help in Eastern Europe; another two treading the red carpet and breaking down hotel apartheid at the invitation of the South African government!). It is worth remembering that Mr. Tshombe no longer controls the rich mining area of north Katanga, which, under Mr. Sendwe, will now be defended from Leopoldville. The new Belgian government appears to be reconciled to Katanga's re-unification with the rest of the Congo; and it looks as though its independent flag is on its way out. The U.N. have given a firm undertaking that they will not stand in the way of Mr. Adoula's determination to restore his government's authority in Katanga.

The army is still an unpredictable factor. Mr. Adoula will be wise to bring Gizengist General Lundula back into play in its re-organisation, along, possibly, with Colonel Mobutu. There will remain the long, uphill battle to restore order and progress to a crippled economy. A struggle of that order will naturally produce conflicts within the government, particularly as it will involve inter-regional rivalries for attention.

But Mr. Adoula deserves the full support of socialists and men of goodwill everywhere. The impact of the Congo catastrophe in Pan-African circles (the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs divided largely on this issue), and in Afro-European relations cannot yet be fully assessed, and may take a generation or more to erase. Mr. Adoula is a restlessly energetic and determined leader with an understanding of Pan-African nationalism. He will need all these talents: we wish him well.

### JOMO KENYATTA

THE Bureau welcomes without reservation the release of Mr. Kenyatta in Kenya, which we advocated over a year ago. It has long been clear that his participation in the political life of Kenya was a pre-requisite for the restoration of confidence and orderly government. The joint proposals for advance which have been put forward by the leaders of both major African parties under Kenyatta's Chairmanship, should be accepted by the British Government.

#### Bureau Staff Changes

Lady Selwyn-Clarke retired from the Secretaryship of the Bureau on July 14, 1961: but she will continue with the Bureau as Adviser. Miss Margaret Roberts, Assistant Secretary, has been appointed Secretary.



# What Have You Done,

by COLIN MORRIS

## Mr. MACLEOD ?

NORTHERN Rhodesian politicians have by now put away their slide rules and decided that they know enough about the permutations and combinations of the new Constitution not only to be able to assess their chances at the next elections but also to set up as football pool consultants if Africa gets too hot for them.

It is a depressing experience for the Northern Rhodesian on leave in London to meet a whole succession of Tory specialists on Africa who staunchly assure one that Macleod has not knuckled under to Welensky and that he really thinks that the final Constitution perpetuates the spirit and intention of the original White Paper. As an erstwhile admirer of Mr. Macleod, I would much rather believe that he sold out the African people in Northern Rhodesia for robustly political reasons (the lure of 10 Downing Street and all that) than that he has been guilty of ineptitude. The knave can be redeemed, the fool never !

Newspaper correspondents in the know assure me that Mr. Macleod complacently believes that he has destroyed Welensky politically and has laid the foundations for majority rule in Northern Rhodesia. If this is the case, then the Colonial Secretary is deluded both about the psychological effects of his change of front and about the way in which the Constitution will work out on the ground.

What has Mr. Macleod done ? In the first place he has destroyed any lingering trust which the African people had in the integrity of the British Government. For, outrageously unfashionable though this attitude may be, the African people, even the most hardened nationalists, fundamentally trusted Britain to do right by them in the end, in spite of abundant evidence to the contrary since the inception of Federation.

### Betrayal of Confidence

Ask any articulate African why he opposes Federation and he will tell you that the Federation is a device whereby Welensky would be able to block the advance of protected peoples to self-rule. I have heard this cry so often that I had come to discount it as an over-simplification of the Federation issue. Not any more. The betrayal of Northern Rhodesia vindicates them completely. Sir Roy Welensky, in the interests of white domination, has been able to intervene successfully in an issue where he has no constitutional standing whatsoever, other than the right to consultation, and embarrass, blackmail or wheedle a callow British Cabinet into betraying solemn obligations to people who placed themselves willingly under British Protection.

Mr. Macleod has also taught the African leaders a thing or two about the best way to win concessions from the British Government. He has proved conclusively that if you are reasonable and constitutional in your dealings with the Tories, they will string you

along. It's the man who hits them hard below the belt whom they accommodate. The one political party which boycotted the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference wins the concessions; the parties and movements who loyally went through the charade of negotiation at Lancaster House and in Lusaka are suavely led up the garden path. This lesson will undoubtedly be pondered by the African nationalist leaders.

It may also be discomforting to Mr. Macleod to learn that he has given Sir Roy Welensky's waning prestige in Northern Rhodesia a tonic boost. In the months following the publication of the White Paper, there was a steady drain of Europeans from the U.F.P. to the Liberal Party. There was little idealism about this trend. It looked as though Welensky had lost; that the day of the Federation's Iron Man was coming to an end; better, therefore, face up to the inevitable and support a group who could work well with Africans during a period of inter-dependence. Macleod's radical policy line could have been strengthened by the perfectly valid claim that growing numbers of Europeans as well as Africans supported it. Instead, following Sir Roy's flamboyant claims of total victory over the British Government, the great trek back to the U.F.P. has started. Not only are the numerous waverers coming back into the fold, but Europeans who are liberals of long standing have quit the Liberal Party for the U.F.P. At heart, 99 out of every 100 Europeans would prefer to see Black Government delayed for a few years. Welensky, in their view, has won them this breathing space. Therefore it would be churlish not to back him to the hilt. Hence, the Northern wing of the U.F.P., which was crumbling, is now firmly back on top.

Mr. Macleod will like least what he had done to Kenneth Kaunda—his 'ideal' nationalist leader. To put it bluntly, he has made him look an utter fool. Kaunda unwillingly agreed to operate the original Macleod Plan for one reason only—if the Plan did not give the nationalists what they were demanding, at least it ensured the end of the U.F.P.'s stranglehold on political power. It also made certain of an anti-Federation majority in the Legislative Council. Macleod must have known that the slightest concession to Welensky would result in Kaunda throwing the whole Constitution overboard. Yet the concessions were made.

My own view, and I claim no inside knowledge, is that the Cabinet, with that streak of cynical realism which is one of the great strengths of a Tory Government, (and which will ensure that I die a Socialist) reduced all the complexities of the issue to one simple question—'Who is in a position to embarrass us most at this point—Welensky or Kaunda?' Quite correctly in the short term, they concluded that the extremely efficient Northern

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# MUST THERE BE A CEILING ON AID ?

By HILARY MARQUAND, M.P.

WHEN Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced his measures to check the drain on the United Kingdom's monetary reserves and rectify the balance of payments, Mr. Iain Macleod, the Colonial Secretary, was negotiating with a delegation from Tanganyika the final arrangements for independence—including the future economic aid.

Acting in accordance with Mr. Lloyd's announcement Mr. Macleod put forward proposals which were wholly inadequate. Had they been accepted, the Tanganyika three-year development plan could not have been started. Mr. Nyerere's vigorous protests, backed energetically in question and debate by Labour M.P.s as well as some Conservatives, and followed by a dramatic flight to London by Sir Richard Turnbull, Governor of Tanganyika, forced our government to back down.

When the delegation from Gambia comes to London in October for economic talks we shall use every effort to ensure that it too receives fair treatment. Britain, if she is to play her part in a manner consistent with her past as a colonial power and her responsibilities to the Commonwealth, must make her aid larger and more effective if the modest aim of a two per cent. annual increase in the pitiful living standards of Indians, Pakistanis, Nyasas, Gambians and others is to be achieved.

## Inadequate Aid

At present United Kingdom government aid to under-developed countries is running at the rate of £150m. a year, though it has only recently reached that figure. Private investment in the same countries also amounts to about £150m. a year. This combined total of £300m. represents about one and a third per cent. of our national income. Years ago, when the S.U.N.F.E.D.<sup>1</sup> project was put forward within the United Nations, the experts calculated that it would require a contribution of one per cent. of the national incomes of the fully developed countries to launch it. Subsequently this figure of one per cent. has come to be regarded by many as all that is needed; and when our government now quotes one and one-third per cent. as the figure achieved, the Chancellor probably hopes that it will be a sufficient answer to those who press for more. I do not believe that it is.

*It must be remembered that the protagonists of S.U.N.F.E.D. were thinking of government aid for a well considered world-wide plan for building up the economic potential of under-developed countries. The provision of outright non-repayable grants, which will finance the essential infrastructure of*

development but throw no burden of repayment upon the balance of payments of under-developed countries, is an essential part of a properly conceived and effective plan for aid. None but governments can supply such aid in effective volume. Britain should aim to provide as soon as possible at least one per cent. of her gross national product by this method. It would involve a 'sacrifice', for example, of half-a-crown a week by a worker earning £12 10s. a week.

## Burden of Interest

More than half of United Kingdom government aid, and all our private investment now being provided, is in forms requiring at least annual payment of interest or dividends and in many instances repayment of capital. Both Professor Benham and Mr. Shonfield, who have recently written admirably clear and well-reasoned books<sup>2</sup> about economic aid, agree that substantial accumulation of indebtedness of this kind can be harmful rather than helpful to under-developed countries. If the proportion of loans in our aid is not reduced, without diminishing its total, we are heading for trouble in years to come.

Private investment must of course be repayable and may be of varying degrees of value to an under-developed country. A new hotel devoted entirely to earning foreign exchange may be as welcome as a factory using local raw materials; but the building of elaborate housing for expatriate business executives will obviously be less so. The construction of a department store which creates unemployment among local small traders, or of a cinema to give entertainment is even lower down any conceivable list of development needs. **If, then, the total of government aid plus private investment at any time places a strain upon our balance of payments, it is clear that we should impose, through exchange control, a system of priority allocation upon private investment rather than trim down direct government aid to well-defined development plans.**

It is even more important that we should not permit recurring balance of payments difficulties to subject our overseas trade to a series of fits and starts. The aid must not only be larger than it has been, but it should be continuous, and therefore a reliable component of the economic plans of the receiving countries. With our annual income per head of more than £350 it would be disgraceful that we should say to countries in which such incomes are £20 or £25, or even less: '*We are sorry, but we have been having a spending spree, and so we cannot fulfil our promise to help you!*' Overseas aid is not bounty from the rich man's table: it is a necessity, because in the long run prosperity is indivisible, and because it is essential to prove that

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<sup>2</sup> *Economic Aid to Under-Developed Countries* by Frederic Benham, O.U.P. for Roy. Inst. Econom. Aff., pp. 121., 12s. 6d.

*The Attack on World Poverty* by Andrew Shonfield, Chatto and Windus, pp. 226, 21s.

<sup>1</sup> Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.



# **WESTERN NIGERIA: EXPERIMENT IN PROGRESS**

by **T. F. BETTS**

**I**N Western Nigeria today one of the most interesting developments is the Farm Settlement Scheme, initiated last year on the basis of advice received from experts from Israel and the Food and Agriculture Organisation.

In a sense, this Scheme is an outcome of the Government's intensive educational programme. Between 1954 and 1960 the annual output of primary school leavers has risen from 70,000 to 180,000. Hitherto, education has in the main been regarded by its recipients as a means of escape from farming, an occupation associated with illiteracy, a low-level income, heavy manual labour and a lack of social amenities in the communities. The new scheme aims to recruit school-leavers holding Primary VI leaving certificates or better, who have come from farming families, and to establish them as modern farmers in four phases.

The first of these will be two years in one of a number of Farm Institutes now being built, during which time recruits will be trained in modern agriculture, and given board and lodging and some clothing free. The second phase requires the prospective settler for two years to eat and work communally in the establishment of the holdings on a Community Farm Settlement in his home Region. During this period he will be provided with free board and lodging and farm clothing, and paid an allowance of £3 a month which will be debited to his account as part of the capital cost of establishing his holding. He will also be expected to supplement his allowance by growing food crops.

## **Family Holdings**

During the third phase, which is expected to last three to five years, depending upon the crop and the settler's financial needs, each individual will be allocated his own holding and house by ballot within the settlement and may be joined by his wife. He may continue to receive a monthly allowance which will be debited to his account. The fourth phase begins when the settler's farm goes into production and he is expected to start repaying his loan.

The size of the settlement is fixed at 200 families. They will be equipped with all the necessary communal buildings—schools, clinics, shopping centre, community centre, etc. The size of the settlement is dictated by the necessity to provide electricity and water supplies on a self-supporting basis. The size of holding will vary with the nature of the crops, but they are designed as family holdings not employing paid labour which, with the inclusion of permanent crops such as cocoa, oil palm, rubber, coconuts or citrus, will yield a gross income of about £450 a year. The total indebtedness of each settler will probably be £3,600 by the time he is established. This will be repaid in 15 annual instalments of £250, leaving the owner a net annual income of about £200.

The government hopes that in addition to providing a satisfying and lucrative livelihood for a number of school leavers, their example will stimulate the spread of modern methods amongst farmers in general, and so make a major contribution to the productivity of the region.

The scheme is being prosecuted already with great vigour. Under British rule, acquisition of land for public purposes was always an extremely ticklish problem, but for this scheme the government has made an appeal to progressive Obas, Chiefs and Local Government Councils for offers of unused land in lots totalling 5,000 acres or more. Already far more land has been offered than can at present be used, and it is to be leased to settlers on a 49-year renewable leasehold at a rate of 1s. per acre (compare the Kenya White Highlands where European settlers up to now have paid 2½d. per acre). The number of school-leaver applicants for the scheme has already reached 9,000 although the maximum intake is only to be 100 a year to each of five Institutes distributed over the Region, or 500 a year in all.

I have a number of misgivings about the scheme.

## **The Disadvantages**

In the first place the intake on the basis of 500 settlers a year in a Region which contains over a million farming families appears to be much too narrow. The scheme is committed this year to absorb £1¼m. out of the £2½m. available for the whole of the agricultural extensions plans.

Secondly, the jump from the present average income of a farming family of about £70 a year to a proposed income of £450 appears to be too sudden in the conditions of West Africa and is likely, with the capital investment available, to make the settlers a class apart from the ordinary cultivators.

Again, although the scheme involves a great deal of co-operative organisation in the settlements, and indeed compulsory membership of a co-operative, it is an agricultural scheme in which, at present the Co-operative Department is little involved; and the Farm Institutes do not include in their curriculum any instruction in co-operative methods and ideals.

The Western Regional Development Corporation pursues another, rather different, approach to agricultural development. This activity is on a plantation basis and its biggest scheme is the Ijebu Farm Project. I was particularly interested in this because I was responsible for its initiation in 1951 when I was still in the Nigerian service. When I then visited the area it was a 20 square mile stretch of forest slum and sporadic low-grade farming. Today it is most impressive to see the 5,000 acres of oil palm, 3,000 acres of cocoa and 800 acres of citrus already established in the most scientific fashion.

Plantations are still expanding and the earliest planted areas are only just coming into bearing,



though they are already showing much higher yields than are normal for the region. The labour force is over 1,600 men, and their families are housed in three modern villages with a central dispensary, isolation ward, School, church and canteen, and it is one of the boasts of the farm manager that the scheme has inculcated a spirit of industry amongst Ijebus who used to be considered unemployable as labour. Their productivity, and with it their earnings, has increased noticeably during the last few years. The scheme also boasts a half million pound palm oil mill which is to go into operation next year.

### Productivity and Cost

The ultimate profitability of the project is still in doubt, particularly in relation to oil palm and citrus. Citrus has experienced marketing difficulties; and losses have been made on trial shipments for direct export of fruit surplus to the requirements of the Lafia Cannery at Ibadan. With oil palms the main difficulty seems to be that these are marginal soils for the crop, and fertiliser costs are high. Although fertilisers are imported in bulk they cost £23 a ton at Lagos compared with an equivalent of £14 a ton at nearest railway station for British farmers under the U.K. subsidy scheme. This is a significant pointer to the difficulty of inculcating the use of fertilisers generally in these regions unless cheap local production or a subsidy can be introduced.

Doubts have also been expressed about the wisdom of investing so heavily in the new palm oil mill, a decision which was taken over the manager's head. Out-turn from existing plantations and the extensions at present planned will be inadequate to keep the mill working at capacity even when the trees come to full bearing. It will therefore be necessary to extend planting into the neighbouring forest reserve, sacrificing good timber in the process. This also means that the mill is unlikely to be at full capacity for five to ten years after installation and this must affect its profitability.

Finally, there is little liaison between the Development Corporation and the Extension Services of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ijebu Project is an isolated island in the middle of an ocean of peasant producers to whom the project means nothing and who have no access to it. This is significant in view of the statement in the 1959 Agricultural Policy Paper that

'It has been shown in other newly developing countries that when successful plantations have been established individual peasant enterprises using the best plantation techniques start of their own accord on the fringes and in the shadow of such plantations. Their activity can be guided to emulate the methods for improved cultivation adopted in the plantations.'

The Co-operative Movement is still making great strides. By March, 1960, it boasted over 1,000 societies with deposits and reserves of nearly £2m. and handling export produce worth £4½m. and consumer goods worth nearly £1½m. Its marketing and credit societies had issued loans of over £600,000 and have a good record of recovery of loans. The Co-operative Bank shows net assets of well over £1m. and plays a vital part in financing both the

marketing and consumer movements.

Perhaps one of the most interesting developments is that in the field of day-to-day consumer goods. I was interested to visit the modern and efficient Co-operative Supermarkets now in operation in Lagos and Ibadan. But the biggest extension of co-operative activity in the future is likely to be in the field of agriculture extension work. I therefore have the gravest doubts about the wisdom of the retention of the Co-operative Department under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, rather than under the Ministry of Agriculture. The present arrangement is a legacy from the period when the movement was fighting to gain a foothold in the marketing of cocoa and other produce. It is now firmly established in this field, and it is the official policy of the Government that it should become the main means of marketing of all export products.

Nevertheless, despite the high place in agricultural development assigned to it, the Co-operative Division of the Ministry of Trade and Industry still absorbs less than one per cent. of Regional recurrent expenditure. The 1960-1965 Development Plan gives little recognition to the need for expansion. The Plan provides £140,000 for a new Co-operative College and £77,000 for grants to Co-operative Societies. It also allocates £4,960,000 for the new Farm Settlements, and although these are to be co-operative in organisation, they are to be under the control of The Agricultural Extension Service. In addition there is an item of £1½m. for 'Credit Facilities for Primary Production'.

But as long as co-operatives are under the Ministry of Trade and Industry and agricultural development is under the Ministry of Agriculture, such credit facilities are unlikely to be rationally channelled through existing co-operative credit organisations. The loan issues at present made through marketing societies are not, in the main, a productive form of credit. They are largely for seasonal crop advances for cocoa purchases, and to some extent short-term loans for spraying equipment and pesticides, both aimed specifically at the seasonal crops grown under customary methods. They are, in fact, a perpetuation under controlled conditions of the commercial advances of the past.

### Change of Ministry

Despite these crop finance facilities, the marketing side of the movement has recently shown signs of stagnation. In 1951-52 co-operatives marketed eight per cent. of the Region's cocoa crop and from then until 1955-56 the movement increased its share to 17 per cent. But since then it has hovered around the 17 per cent. to 18½ per cent. mark without improvement, and the efforts made to extend co-operative marketing to other products have had little success. The explanation lies, I think, in the impetus given to the movement *vis-à-vis* the foreign mercantile firms in the early years of regional self-government, and the loss of that impetus as the foreign firms withdrew from the produce field to be replaced by local African buyers. The movement's future to my mind depends on closer ties with basic agricultural development, and this means a change of Ministry.

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Rhodesia Police, aided by Sir Roy's militia, were in a position to contain any overt evidence of nationalist indignation. So they chose Welensky, since his indignation might have the destructive quality of a Broken Hill bull in the diplomatic china shop.

All this is not to suggest that Kaunda could do nothing. His hold upon UNIP is stronger than ever. Nevertheless, he cannot speak for all Northern Rhodesia Africans and the voluntary restrictions which he has placed upon himself by his philosophy of non-violence increase the possibility of spontaneous outbreaks of violence from Africans who feel that neither endless negotiation nor exposing oneself to suffering as a form of pressure make much sense.

Kaunda must now 'put up or shut up'. He cannot go on for ever breathing threats and then postponing their implementation whilst he makes yet one more 'last appeal' the British Government. With Welensky grinning on the touchline and the Argus Press openly claiming that Kaunda's inaction is due not so much to self-restraint as to utter confusion, Macleod has forced Kaunda into the open. He must either call UNIP to a course of action whose effects are likely to fall far short of his claims or do nothing and allow others to profit by his loss of face and authority.

All in all, what Mr. Macleod has done is to alter the classification of Northern Rhodesia from *Most Hopeful* of territories in British Africa to *Most Desperate*. It is heart-breaking for many Northern Rhodesians of both races, as well as their friends in Britain, to realise that the majestic progression of the Territory to a Tanganyika-type future has been interrupted, and that the models for the future are more likely to be found to the south rather than the north.

*This is what you have done, Mr. Macleod!*

(Continued from page 5)

rapid economic growth can be sustained without resort to totalitarianism. We must stabilise our terms of trade with the under-developed world, so as to minimise the fluctuations which so largely cause 'balance of payments difficulties'; and we must eliminate waste and promote efficiency in our economy so as to have surpluses available for steady investments overseas. We must be prepared to cut our less essential imports if these measures fail.

In the effort to educate the British public to full understanding of the importance and the techniques of aid, Professor Benham has contributed a clear, concise and very readable introduction. Mr. Shonfield's longer study is a major contribution to our understanding of the whole problem. It is lively, clear and stimulating; dealing masterfully with the theory; clearly expounding the facts and decisively criticising and suggesting remedies for the defects of administration. Reluctantly, one is forced to agree with his conclusion that S.U.N.F.E.D. is a mirage. Enthusiastically one welcomes his exposition of the case for using Western capacity to produce foodstuffs far in excess of our capacity to consume them as a quick and ready-to-hand instrument of aid. Admiringly, one recommends his book to

every library in the developed world, and as many as possible in the under-developed.

## Correspondence

To the Editor of VENTURE

Sir, 'Fabian' writing in your July issue from Dar-es-Salaam expresses the understandable resentment of East Africans at the apparent insouciance of the West about affairs in Angola. I write to assure him that there are very many in Western Europe who are appalled at the callous repression of the Salazar regime and at its refusal to admit of even the existence, let alone the legitimacy, of African political aspirations.

Popular opinion in this country has been shocked and scandalised by what your correspondent so aptly describes as a Western Hungary. The Christian churches in particular have spoken out and acted vigorously. In Parliament the Labour Opposition has challenged Government policy continuously ever since the rebellion broke out in March. Even the right-wing press has urged Portugal to define her aims and to re-assess her policies. But the British Government has been slow to respond to this pressure and has fallen far behind what the popular will demands.

This to the minds of many is wholly regrettable since the moral issues at stake are clearer than in most international crises of recent years. The Portuguese forces both civilian and military have conducted an indiscriminate campaign against the African population with an estimated loss of African life of between 20,000 and 50,000 dead. A high percentage have been innocent of anything but the mildest form of political activity and many not even of that. Some observers have put casualties as high as 100,000, and at least 133,000 refugees have crossed into the Leopoldville province of the Congo Republic.

The total figure, including those who have fled from the Camaxilo area further south, is probably nearer 150,000. In Central Angola large numbers of educated Africans are detained in prison, and some are known to have died under interrogation.

On August 9th, the London *Times* quoted the words of the Portuguese Army Minister advocating the large-scale immigration of soldier-settlers to occupy Angola. A more blatant example of militant imperialism has not been heard of in this century. Is this what NATO stands for?

Before we condemn unequivocally the Portuguese people it is worth reminding ourselves how frail is freedom's foothold in Portugal itself. Portugal's weakest spot is her economy which will be gravely affected if the war in Angola draws out. Social and political unrest could follow and sweep this totalitarian anachronism into limbo. If Portugal should thus regain its lost liberty through the courage and tenacity of one of her subject peoples, this might prove to be the silver lining to the dark clouds of Angola's present tragedy.

Yours faithfully,

CLIFFORD PARSONS

Baptist Missionary Society,  
London, August 10, 1961.



# EVENTS OF TWO MONTHS

(June 16th—August 15th)

## Ghana

Dr. Nkrumah visited countries of Eastern Europe in July and August, in the course of which visits his remarks on colonialism in general and British imperialism in particular caused some diplomatic rustlings.

## Gambia

The Constitutional Conference held in London concluded on July 27th with an agreement for advance in both Legislative and Executive councils, giving the country virtual internal self-government. A date for independence was not set; but a later meeting between the Colonial Secretary and Opposition delegates to the conference apparently allayed their fears that Gambia's progress was being held up.

## Mauritius

The Constitutional Review talks concluded in London on July 8th. Two stages of advance are proposed. During the first the leader of the majority party (Labour Party) will become Chief Minister and the Governor will act partly on the advice of the unofficial African ministers. The second stage, following a general election, will consist in effect of the grant of full internal self-government, with the Chief Minister becoming Premier, and a fully-fledged Council of Ministers. External affairs, defence and internal security will remain the responsibility of the Governor; and the operational control of the police and Special Force will be the responsibility of the Police Commissioner under the Governor's authority.

The final communiqué concluded that the stage after internal self-government would not be predictable at this point. It was the general wish that Mauritius should remain in the Commonwealth but whether this should be achieved as an independent state or in some form of special association with the U.K. or other Commonwealth countries would be considered during the next few years. The majority Labour Party and the Muslim Committee of Action accepted the proposals with qualifications; but two opposition parties rejected them.

## Southern Rhodesia

Mr. Michael Mawema, formerly President of the National Democratic Party and now Secretary of the Zimbabwe National Party, who had won his appeal against conviction under the Law and Order Maintenance Act, is to face the courts again. The Southern Rhodesian Attorney General is appealing to the Federal Supreme Court against his acquittal by the High Court of Southern Rhodesia.

Three African secondary schools have experienced unrest, politically inspired; pupils have been dismissed and classes temporarily closed. The schools are St. Xavier School, the Goromonzi Government Secondary School and the Dadaya Mission.

## South-east Asia

On July 31 Malaya, the Philippines and Siam established an association for closer economic and cultural co-operation, to be known as the Association of South-east Asia. (A.S.A.)

## Angola: Nehru's Warning

Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, warned Britain on July 30th that he was 'deeply grieved' that Britain continued to supply arms to Portugal.

## South Africa

The Defence Minister, Mr. Fouché, visited Europe in June to purchase arms, the country's defence expenditure having increased by more than 40 per cent. this year. It is not known whether he received arms in Britain; or whether he succeeded in forming a defence pact with the Central African Federation and Portugal. Both possibilities were the subject of questions in the British Parliament, to no avail.

There will be a general election on October 18th. The International Monetary Fund has agreed to lend the country £26½m. during the next year. There has been unrest at four widely dispersed African high schools.

## East Africa

In July the first step towards the establishment of a University of East Africa was taken with two appointments by the University's Provisional Council. Mr. Bernard de Bunsen was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Royal College, Nairobi; and Professor Cranford Pratt of the University of Toronto was appointed First Principal of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, which has not yet opened.

## Ghana—Guinea—Mali

The Union of African States formally came into being on July 1st with the simultaneous publication of its Charter in Accra, Conakry and Bamako.

## South-west Africa

Having granted the U.N. Committee on South-west Africa visas for Bechuanaland, the British Government has subsequently revoked its permission, because the Committee refused to undertake not to enter South-west Africa from Bechuanaland.

## Publication

Report of the Leeward Islands and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference. (Cmnd. 1434, H.M.S.O. 1s.).

The Colonial Territories, 1960-61. (Cmnd. 1407, H.M.S.O. 7s.).

The West Indies: Cameo Series on the U.K. Dependencies, (H.M.S.O. 6d.).

The Colombo Plan Story 1951-61. (Colombo Plan Bureau, Colombo).

Cameroons Development Corporation, Report and Accounts, 1960. (C.D.C. Head Office, Botsuwa, Victoria, Southern Cameroons).

Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961. (Cmnd. 1417, H.M.S.O. 2s.).

Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change. (Cmnd. 1423, H.M.S.O. 9d.).

The Future of East Africa High Commission Services. (Cmnd. 1433, H.M.S.O. 1s.).

Colonial Development and Welfare Act: Return of Schemes, 1960-1961. (H.M.S.O. 3s.).

5 8 3



# Parliament and the Commonwealth

## BANK OF AFRICA

Mr. John Foster introduced a motion referring to 'a project for the establishment of a bank in which Africans as directors and shareholders will take the lead'. It was envisaged that a pilot bank should be created in Salisbury, that the capital should be £250,000, if necessary provided at this stage from European sources, but that half of the share capital should be held, so to speak on option for Africans to subscribe when the project had succeeded. If early success should come to the bank and its operations, the proposal was that the shareholding should be more or less 50 per cent. European and 50 per cent. African. It was proposed that the Board should be divided between Europeans and Africans, with the chairman an African so that it would represent to the Africans an African bank. Necessarily at this stage, the know-how would be provided by Europeans. The project must not be confused with any idea of Africanising the personnel who would run the bank. The bank would be training Africans to take over positions of responsibility. There was a parallel proposal that a similar type of bank should be established in Kenya, and the fact that these proposals had been made by the nationalist leaders and that this opportunity of a debate in the House had been secured had been widely welcomed in Kenya. It was said that the new Department of Technical Co-operation would make available information as to where finance to assist in the territories could be found and how it could be obtained. Mr. Chitepo might be said to be one of the originators of the scheme, and Mr. Kaunda had given his approval to it. Dr. Kiano also helped with the preparation of the Memorandum, and Mr. Gekundo and Mr. Nkomo had assisted with suggestions.

Mr. H. A. Marquand referred to the different approach of his Party from that of the Government to the subject of banking generally. His Party placed emphasis on the necessity for public control over banking operations through the law, and on the desirability of having a substantial measure of public ownership in banking operations, either through nationally owned institutions or through co-operatively owned institutions. But that did not alter the basic fact that there would always be the need for short-term banking operations, the sort of job which the commercial banks undertake, raising their money from depositors. He was making a distinction here between the commercial bank operating short-term credit provisions and the investment bank which was concerned with long-term investment, and what he had to say was not related to the long-term investment bank. The Colonial Office could be directly concerned with this matter only at a later stage. For the time being it certainly seemed to be one which the new Secretary of the Department of Technical Co-operation might explore and his Department was well staffed now with per-

sons who had experience of Africa—particularly its Director-General—so that between them they should be able to help this idea along. He would go so far as to say that the plan was interesting, it had the sponsorship which his Party could recognise as both responsible and well informed, and it dealt with the provision of services which would be necessary whatever form of society the Africans eventually decided to establish in their independent territories. (Aug. 4th, 1961.)

**Financial Assistance to Tanganyika.** Mr. Macleod said that the British Government would give Tanganyika the £4.75m. of Colonial Development and Welfare money already allocated, an additional development grant of £4m. and a Commonwealth Assistance loan of up to £4m. to the extent that this was required over and above the £8.75m. of grants and any other sums which might be available from other sources, in order to finance the Tanganyika Government's new three-year Development Plan of £8m. a year. In addition, an interest-free loan would be made of £6m. towards the compensation scheme with a grace period on repayment; and a loan of £3m. on the normal terms for Commonwealth Assistance loans towards commutation of pensions. The Government would provide certain sums in respect of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation and hand over the assets of the Corporation, valued at £1m.; they would pay for the Tanganyika military forces up to March 31st, 1962, about £200,000, and also make a cash payment for Tanganyika's share of the stores of the East African land forces, £34,000. It was the government's hope and belief that other friendly governments would wish to join in helping Tanganyika with her Development Plan. (Aug. 4th, 1961.)

**Nyasaland.** Mr. Biggs-Davison asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he was aware that houses and other property of African opponents of the Malawi Congress party had been burnt down; what counter-measures had been taken by the Nyasaland authorities; and whether he would consider the postponement of elections in the Protectorate until there was freedom from intimidation.

Mr. Iain Macleod replied that in the Visanza sub-district of Central Province six houses of prominent Africans, four of them owned by United Federal Party officials, had been burnt down on the night of July 26th; a further house, two cattle kraals and two food stores belonging to the same persons were destroyed on the night of the 27th; and, 15 miles away, two houses, one belonging to a Malawi Congress Party supporter, were destroyed by fire on the night of the 28th. The police were actively investigating these incidents, which showed no evidence of political intimidation inspired by Malawi Congress Party leaders. The Governor, who was in the best position to judge, saw no justification for postponing the elections either locally or generally. (Aug. 3rd, 1961.)



# Guide to Books . . .

## The Economic Development of Tanganyika

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Survey Mission (O.U.P. for Johns Hopkins Press, 68s.)

## A Short History of Tanganyika

By P. H. C. Clarke (Longmans, 16s. 6d.)

*The Economic Development of Tanganyika* is the usual encyclopaedic report of an International Bank Survey Mission. In a volume so large there are almost bound to be some good things, and the reader will learn a great deal about Tanganyika's economy. Although many of the data are accessible in the Tanganyika Government's admirable *Statistical Abstract*, the Bank report will be a useful reference book. Not all the Mission's analyses and recommendations are likely, however, to obtain universal approval.

The basic argument so far as agricultural development is concerned (and, rightly, this is the Mission's main concern) can be easily stated. The growth of agricultural output has taken place by the expansion of the cultivated area rather than by an increase in yields. The scope for continued expansion of this kind is limited, at any rate in some parts of the country. In the next few years, production can be increased only by 'improvement' within the given framework of African agriculture. But 'improvement' must be increasingly supplemented by 'transformation' programmes (the distinction between 'improvement' and 'transformation' is a central theme of the analysis) designed to introduce a markedly more efficient agriculture, which will maintain soil fertility and justify the injection of capital. The aim would be to create farming systems 'based on more intensive and permanent use of the land by efficiently run, planned farms of economic size'.

The Mission see little chance of transforming African agriculture in its existing locations, 'consequently, the transformation programme should rely to a considerable degree on securing quicker and higher returns on investment and effort by using selected, sparsely populated areas for planned settlement schemes and cattle ranches'. The trouble is that the unsettled areas of Tanganyika are very dry (as the groundnut scheme found to its cost—and is it going too far to catch a hint of at least part of the groundnut fallacy in the Mission's report?); so that transformation along these lines requires a large programme of irrigation. Expenditure on water development would rise from 12 per cent. of the capital budget in 1960-61 to over 25 per cent. in 1965-66.

This argument raises many doubts. Is it right to dismiss so readily the possibility of progress in African agriculture, particularly without a most thorough analysis of the constraints under which it operates? Should investment of such a long-term character as resettlement and irrigation play so large a part in Tanganyika's development programme? Will Africans be persuaded to take part in the schemes in sufficient numbers? And why were the

Mission not more influenced by the 'melancholy' history of irrigated trial farms to which their report draws attention? These questions are not rhetorical and the report does not adequately answer them.

Perhaps the most striking general impression given by the report is of fence-sitting. 'It is important (the report declares) to avoid, so far as possible, projects which have harmful or disappointing results'. There are not many remarks as trite as that, but too often the Mission dodge round a complex problem with an expression of acceptable sentiment. For example, on the question of the compulsory sale of crops through co-operative societies, they say, 'while there are strong practical reasons for . . . one-channel marketing . . . every effort should be made to avoid serious infringement of the voluntary and democratic character of the co-operatives'.

Another important example of the same tendency concerns estate agriculture. An analysis of the way in which the existing estates benefit Tanganyika leads to the conclusion that they should not be prevented from flourishing, but there is only the merest hint about the possibility of expanding estate production. Opposition to such expansion is understandable under colonial conditions, but an independent Tanganyika (and the opportunities opened up by the new political climate are, in other connections, rightly stressed by the Mission) should have enough self-confidence to look at the matter afresh.

Mr. Clarke, an Education Officer in Tanganyika, manages to survey the history of the country from the geological beginnings to 1960, within the confines of a 2,000-word vocabulary and 154 pages. His book is designed mainly for the upper forms of middle schools, and it is well illustrated with maps and drawings.

Arthur Hazlewood

## The Fall of Kruger's Republic

By J. S. Marais (O.U.P., 35s.)

A humourless and detached history of an event or period of acute controversy can often be dull but nevertheless invaluable. For a South African to have written an informative and unbiased account of the events leading up to the Boer War is no mean achievement. Whatever may be thought about South Africa today, the Boer War has left such a legacy of bitterness that even many South African liberals cannot write about it without unreasoning anger. Yet apart from some tendency to make Kruger himself a bit larger than life, Mr. Marais exercises such restraint that it is very difficult to detect where his sympathies lie. Of course neither side really deserves any sympathy: on the one hand, a motley collection of fortune seekers motivated by greed in its grossest form; on the other, a surly and insular outback community, loudly protesting against the injustices it suffers, while at the same time oppressing others to a far worse degree.

Marais follows a well-trodden path; from the first



election of Kruger, through the gold rush on the Witwatersrand and the advent of Chamberlain to the final breakdown of negotiations at Bloemfontein. But partly because of his obvious scholarly integrity and partly because of the poignancy of recent events in South Africa, one is never tempted to dismiss it all as "old hat." (Besides, there is the usual game of drawing historical parallels to be played—for example, between the Jameson raid and the Suez fiasco). It was a story to which there could be only one outcome, the triumph of British Imperialism. Indeed considering the skill and cunning Joseph Chamberlain put into his work, it seems a little surprising in retrospect that it all took so long. It may perhaps be possible to feel a touch of pity for Steyn and Kruger, as they watched their republics steadily becoming isolated and encircled.

For Chamberlain's intrigues and double-dealing one can only feel contempt and disgust. We learn, for instance, that he intended his South African policy to be a "national rather than a party policy"—a sure sign of a Conservative Minister embarking on something more than usually dishonest! Unfortunately the dishonesty of his policy served but to blind his Liberal successors to the real merits of the imperial connection as a means of safeguarding the interests of the Native population—as well as to drive the Afrikaners into irreconcilable opposition. Because of this, the Boer War has had to be ceremonially fought again and again. It has been won by the Afrikaners through the creation of a Republic, and any chance of reconciliation between all the races in South Africa has been irretrievably lost. Because of this, in a few years' time, both sides may be destroyed in the course of a far greater conflict.

John Lee

### The New Nigerian Elite.

By Hugh H. Smythe and Mabel M. Smythe (O.U.P. £2).

Most of the material on which the facts and opinions in this book are based was collected in 1957-58 and to that extent it is not up-to-date. This book is calculated to raise the blood pressure of many of those who have spent the greater part of their working lives in Nigeria and among the Nigerian elite too!

This is partly because dogmatic assertions are made and conclusions reached after the study in depth of only 156 reputed members of the Nigerian elite at a time when there must have been at least a thousand Nigerian members of the Senior Civil Service. This was no random sampling nor can the findings be regarded as statistically valid, a distinct bias existing on political and geographical lines, since the much larger and more populous Northern Region hardly came into the picture. Furthermore, the authors indulge in criticism of British officials in such phrases as 'one cannot resist the temptation to conjecture what remnant of nostalgia and *guilt* (my italics) for the past and regret or hostility at his declining status lies behind the frequently conventional smile and handshake.' And 'the European, seeing his position of dominance crumbling, challenged at every turn, is visibly frustrated at his own inability to prevent a downward revision of his position in the new structure; he may resort to excessive and bitter criticism of Nigerians, often for faults which he is unwilling to recognise in himself.'

In point of fact quite a strong body of opinion existed amongst the leaders in Northern Nigeria in favour of more gradual transfer of power than was contemplated by British officials. It is true that some British officials may have been guilty of the attitudes described; but the easy painless birth of the independent Nigeria is surely sufficient proof of the loyalty of the majority to a conclusion which inevitably entailed their own replacement by the Nigerian elite.

The authors bring out well the difficulties and struggles of the 'marginal' elite, many of them young men who have returned to Nigeria from Great Britain or the United States full of ambition but lacking the necessary experience enabling them to occupy posts reserved for the elite themselves. They quite rightly say that Nigeria has not yet moved so far away from its original sociocultural patterns as to make it possible to break completely with the past.

Nevertheless, by their thoughtful field study Mr. and Mrs. Smythe have undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding of the difficulties attending the Nigerianisation of the public services met with by the new leaders.

Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke

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